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Price Concentration: New Evidence from Greek 
Industries and the Cournot Model 
 
1. Introduction 
The literature in the area of industrial concentration has investigated the association 
between price and the number of sellers across a number of industries (Caves et al., 
1991; Porter, 1993; Wiggins and Maness, 2004). This literature also provides explicit 
indexes for a variety of variables, including prices and sales (Martin, 2002).  
It is well known that increases in concentration are closely (and positively) 
associated with market power, denoting the increased capacity of a number of firms to 
affect prices in the marketplace. Moreover, increased levels of concentration on prices 
provide substantial information about the ability of such firms to harm consumers and 
competition levels. 
 The primary goal of this study is to investigate how prices respond as the number 
of sellers changes across all industries in Greek manufacturing spanning the period 2000-
2011. The reason for selecting the period after 2000 is that following the entrance of the 
country in the Eurozone, there was a strong abolition of subsidies as well as the easiest 
access to funding from the banking sector at lower interest rates. The novelty of the 
paper is that it applies, for the first time the empirical methodological approach relied 
upon two simple models of competition, i.e. the standard Cournot quantity setting model 
and a linear association between prices and the number of sellers. 
Section 2 surveys the literature on price competition across industries, while 
Section 3 presents the methodology and data employed. Section 4 reports the empirical 
results and Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Lopez et al. (2002) argue that higher concentration results in higher prices in nearly all 
industries in the U.S., while Dickson and Sun (2004) through price-concentration 
equations show that the overall effect of rising concentration eventually leads to lower 
prices, which indicates that the majority of concentration models in the literature neglect 
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the impact of technological improvements. Coricelli and Horvath (2008), by making use 
of a micro dataset that accounts for the largest part of the CPI index in Slovakia, find 
that market structure is a significantly important factor of pricing behavior, leading 
primarily to inflation persistence. According to them, increased levels of competition are 
not a guarantee that persistence will be reduced, since persistence is usually fed through 
inertial behaviors induced by the strategic complementarity among price setters. 
 In other strands of the literature, the empirical research examines the association 
between market structure and firms’ performance in terms of profitability (Bresnahan, 
1989; Weiss, 1989), the association between price concentration, profitability and entry 
attraction (de Juan, 2008; Manuszak and Moul, 2008; Singh and Zhu, 2008), the 
association between mergers and acquisitions, price concentration and firms’ profitability 
(Doane et al., 2012) and the impact of market structure on certain economic variables, 
such as TFP (Buccirossi et al., 2011). Finally, Baker (2003), Crandall and Winston 
(2003) and Werden (2003) open up a debatable discussion regarding the effectiveness of 
the antitrust institutional environment. They argue that, on average, competition tends to 
improve economic as well as social welfare by inducing firms to forgo anti-competitive 
behaviors without any type of intervention by competition authorities. Kee and 
Hoekmann (2007) investigate the impact of competition policies on industrial 
profitability in terms of mark-ups. They find no impact running from competition policies 
to mark-ups. 
 In addition, the literature discusses a number of factors driving differences in 
price developments in both the manufacturing and services sectors, pointing out the 
critical role played by the size of competition. In particular, the main findings denote that 
services are characterized by a lower degree of international trading and so competitive 
pressures are weaker there. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Faini et al. (2004) argue 
that the weaker role of competition in services is enhanced by innovative activities, while 
Cavelaars (2003) and Przybyla and Roma (2005) concentrate primarily on the direct 
impact of competition on prices and inflation via downward pressures on profit margins 
and changes in the institutional framework. At the same time, Kalirajan (2000) and Faini 
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et al. (2004) show that the degree of price competition varies across industries and 
countries. 
 Finally, the literature is characterized by a great lack of studies investigating the 
market structure across Greek industries. Only two recent studies are dealing with the 
issue of concentration in the Greek case, those of Bourlakis (1997) and of Rezitis and 
Kalantzi (2011), with the former study focusing on the food industry and the latter study 
giving emphasis on identifying the factors which tend to affect the presence of markups. 
The empirical findings of the former study display the presence of non-competitive 
conditions within this industry. 
 
3. The Methodological Approach and Data 
3.1 The Methodological Approach 
The empirical approach of the paper follows the theoretical specification of the Cournot 
model used by Wiggins and Maness (2004). In particular, the simple Cournot model is 
based on a simple linear inverse demand such as: P(q) = a – bq with constant marginal 
cost, while q represents total industry market output. We also assume N as the number 
of sellers within the industry. Based on these simple assumptions, the market price 
generated by the Cournot model takes the following form: 
P(N) = (a + cN) / (N+1)        (1) 
According to (1), there is a linear relationship between prices and the inverse of the 
number of sellers. 
 One of the assumptions of the Cournot model is that the N sellers are considered 
to be identical, which is a plausible assumption for industries characterized by constant 
returns to scale. According to Tsaliki and Tsoulfidis (1998) and Segoura (1998), this is 
the case for the majority of Greek industries. In empirical terms, the issue is examined by 
taking into consideration the number of competitors as a key variable determining the 
competitiveness of prices. To this end, a proxy for this variable in our case is the use of 
the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) for each industry (Ellison et al., 1997). We also 
include a trend in our model to take into account the fact that manufacturing costs of 
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The sample consists of monthly data spanning the period 2000-2011 on price indexes for 
all Greek manufacturing industries. Data on sectoral prices, proxied by the Consumer 
Price Index sectoral indexes (1995=100), are obtained from Datastream. Data on the 
number of sellers in each industry are obtained from the Independent Statistical Greek 
Committee (ISGC). Market shares needed to construct the HHI are measured as the 
firms’ sales over the industry sales, with sales data also obtained from the ISGC as well. 
The categories of indexes covered are: oil & gas, chemicals, basic resources, 
construction materials, industrial goods, food & beverages, and personal & household 
goods. Our sample data are based on 3-digit SIC classified firms. Finally, the Eviews 
software assisted the empirical analysis. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
To avoid any endogeneity problem, the methodology of IV least squares is used. For the 
empirical purposes of the study we estimate the following versions of the Cournot 
model: 
Model (1): Pt = a + b [1/(Nt+1)] + c HHIt + d TREND 
Model (2): Pt = a + b Nt + c HHIt + d TREND 
Model (3): Pt = a + b Nt + c [1/(1+Nt)] + d HHIt + d TREND 
The results are reported in Table 1. The diagnostics show that all three alternative 
models are free of serial correlation and functional misspecification. The empirical 
findings show that in terms of Model (1), prices across industries are associated with the 
inverse of the number of sellers, as predicted by the Cournot model. The coefficient of 
1/(N+1) across all, but one, industries indicate weak declines when the number of sellers 
increase; in other words, prices do not decline rapidly once the competition increases in 
these industries, implying the absence of strong competition forces. The worst case in 
terms of absence of competition is in the food & beverages industry. The exception is 
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with the Chemicals industries, where the competition is strong, supported by a rapid 
decline in prices when the number of sellers increases. The HHI index across all 
industries, except in Chemicals, is positive and statistically significant, indicating a small 
effect on prices coming from other competitors, while decreasing concentration leads to 
price reductions. In terms of the other two specifications, i.e. Model (2) and Model (3), 
the estimations generate similar results, which confirm the absence of strong competitive 
forces in all industries, except the Chemicals industry. Finally, we reran the models 
without including the trend variable (this point was raised by a referee) and, although we 
had quantitative differences, the new results (available upon request) did not alter the 
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Table 1. Cournot Regressions 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                   Model(1)          Model(2)               Model(3)               Diagnostics 
  co    N     1/(N+1)       T    HH1        co     N     1/(N+1)      T      HH1         co      N     1/(N+1)     T    HH1     R2   LM   RESET   h 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Oil & gas          1.895          2.837       0.77   0.017               0.73  0.34   0.26    0.23 
          (4.64)*        (7.81)*   (4.59)*(1.69)*** 
              2.34  -0.045               0.69    0.011        0.65  0.28   0.24    0.41 
                 (5.93)* (-7.84)*         (4.93)* (1.62)***  
             0.884  -0.048  2.882     0.79  0.013 0.76  0.41   0.33    0.49 
          (2.39)** (-8.0)* (9.73)*  (5.1)* (1.33) 
Chemicals       1.348         24.783      1.88   0.034             0.77  0.39   0.32   0.24 
                        (4.91)*       (9.17)*    (5.44)* (5.24)* 
      2.67  -0.171               1.75     0.058         0.62  0.35   0.37   0.42 
                (4.74)* (-8.49)*           (5.2)*   (5.30)* 
              2.753 -0.159  18.904    1.90  0.073 0.71   0.46  0.30   0.48 
           (3.96)* (-6.52)* (7.64)*  (6.3)* (6.5)* 
 
Basic resources 2.674          1.407       0.65   0.013              0.68  0.47  0.38   0.14 
           (4.81)*         (6.58)*    (5.12) (1.36) 
      3.80  -0.032               0.703    0.009         0.68  0.32  0.29   0.25 
                (6.55)* (-7.19)      (4.93)*  (1.15) 
              1.947  -0.033   1.762    0.74  0.009  0.78  0.47  0.40   0.31 
           (4.36)*  (-9.32)* (8.23)* (4.85)* (1.22)  
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Table 1 continued 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                   Model(1)          Model(2)               Model(3)               Diagnostics 
  co    N     1/(N+1)       T    HH1        co     N     1/(N+1)      T      HH1         co      N     1/(N+1)     T    HH1     R2   LM   RESET   h 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Construction 
materials          1.981         1.449       0.89  0.013            0.71  0.39   0.32    0.22 
                        (5.38)*       (6.58)*   (5.25)* (1.58)***  
      1.63  -0.028               0.804  0.007        0.69  0.30   0.44    0.39 
                (6.11)* (-6.93)*           (4.86)* (1.95)** 
               1.67  -0.033  1.327    0.75  0.009  0.74  0.45   0.37    0.51 
            (2.54)** (-9.7)* (8.6)* (5.4)* (1.14) 
Industrial goods 4.672  1.384       0.77   0.012             0.76 0.38 0.54 0.15                            
              (5.13)*   (7.24)*     (4.11)* (1.38) 
      5.15  -0.023               0.658   0.011         0.68   0.37   0.45  0.31 
                 (5.36)* (-8.44)*          (4.36)* (1.94)** 
                                                                             4.12  -0.033  1.894     0.53 0.014    0.79   0.49   0.61  0.29 
           (4.83)* (-8.56)* (9.14)* (5.4)* (1.2) 
Food &  
beverages          2.553        0.518       0.84   0.004             0.69   0.32   0.30  0.20 
                         (4.91)*      (7.42)*    (5.27)* (1.28) 
      3.15 -0.019                0.764   0.008         0.60   0.29   0.31  0.37 
                 (5.34)* (-6.36)*          4.93)*  (1.11) 
               1.90  -0.014  0.308     0.68 0.012   0.62   0.35   0.31  0.42 
            (5.28)* (-6.4)* (6.28)* (4.5)* (1.38) 
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Table 1 continued 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable                   Model(1)          Model(2)               Model(3)               Diagnostics 




goods              3.447            1.046        0.56  0.016            0.71  0.52   0.42   0.18 
                     (5.10)*           (6.58)*   (5.13)* (1.83)** 
      4.56  -0.019               0.484  0.015        0.68  0.35   0.28   0.34 
                 (5.36)* (-6.18)*         (4.83)* (1.94)** 
               0.67 -0.017     1.962  0.56  0.009  0.73  0.47   0.21   0.38 
             (1.24) (-7.57)* (7.42)* (5.1)* (1.14) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: co denotes the constant term of the regression and T denotes the TREND variable. Figures in parentheses denote t-statistics. LM is a serial 
correlation test, while RESET is a model functional misspecification test. Figures for the the LM and RESET tests denote p-values. Finally, Sargan 
test (h) investigates the validity of instruments used. Figures for the h test denote p-values. The instruments used are: for Model (1) specification = 
constant, 1/[N(-1)+1], [1/(N(-2)+1]. HHI(-1), HHI(-2), HHI(-3). For Model (2) specification = constant, N(-1), N(-2), N(-3), HHI(-1), HHI(-2), HHI(-
3), and for Model (3) specification = constant, N(-1), N(-2), [1/(N(-1)+1], [1/(N(-2)+1], HHI(-1), HHI(-2), HHI(-3). 
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This empirical study examined for the first time the degree of price competition across 
Greek manufacturing industries spanning the period 1980-2011 through the methodology 
of a simple Cournot model. The analysis used data covering seven industrial 
classifications. The empirical findings showed that the majority of Greek industries are 
characterized by the lack of strong competitive forces. These empirical findings seem to 
nicely justify the presence of strong inflation persistence in the majority of industries in 
Greek manufacturing (Apergis, 2013). 
 Given the fact that competitive markets create benefits to the long-run 
performance of an economy, the implications of the empirical findings are very 
important, especially for regulatory authorities. More competitive markets could 
contribute to price reductions and, thus, not only will increase the resilience to economic 
shocks, but also will facilitate the acceptance of recent austerity plans imposed on the 
Greek economy by the Troika.  
A potential strand of extension would be to employ a different analysis. In 
particular, the research attempt could explicitly consider the introduction of brand-name 
products. The reason is that a number of industries are characterized by substantial 
product differentiation, since a quite large number of products achieve brand recognition, 
thus, generating important differences across branded entries and in terms of competitive 
forces. Another potential extension of this empirical study will be the comparison 
between the benefits and the costs of introducing competition laws and enforcing 
competition policies to perform a welfare analysis. It would be also interesting to expand 
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